This report summarizes the findings of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) Update for Spain. Although there is a core of strong banks that are well managed and appear resilient to further shocks, vulnerabilities remain. Substantial progress has been made in reforming the former savings banks, and the most vulnerable institutions have either been resolved or are being restructured. Recent measures address the most problematic part of banks’ portfolios. Moving ahead, a further restructuring and recapitalization of some of the remaining weaker banks may be needed as a result of deteriorating economic conditions.
This paper discusses key findings of the progress report on financial sector reforms in Spain. Spain’s European Stability Mechanism (ESM)-supported program of financial sector reform aimed to assist economic recovery by promoting financial stability. The program was adopted in mid-2012. The Spanish authorities’ implementation of the program has been steadfast. All of the program’s specific measures are now complete. Major structural reform efforts in a variety of areas (including labor and fiscal policies) will need to continue to achieve sufficiently rapid growth to bring unemployment down to reasonable levels over the medium term.
The large and growing international linkages of big Irish banks expose them to idiosyncratic shocks arising in other countries. We analyze international interdependencies of Irish banks-during both normal times and in periods of large shocks or extreme events-using an existing methodology with distance to default (DD) data constructed from the banks” equity prices. The data covers daily observations from January 1994 to November 2005. We first construct rolling correlations between DDs of Irish banks and those of banks from other European countries and the U.S. to analyze trends in cross-country interdependencies. We then use a multinomial logit model to estimate the number of banks in Ireland that experience a large shock on the same day as banks in other countries (“coexceedances”), controlling for Ireland-specific and global factors. We find evidence of increasing cross-border interdependencies over time; differing interlinkage patterns in the pre-Euro, post-Euro, and the post-September 11th periods; and significant cross-border contagion risk from the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands. This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.
Bonds without Borders tells the extraordinary story of how the market developed into the principal source of international finance for sovereign states, supranational agencies, financial institutions and companies around the world. Written by Chris O’Malley – a veteran practitioner and Eurobond market expert- this important resource describes the developments, the evolving market practices, the challenges and the innovations in the Eurobond market during its first half- century. Also, uniquely, the book recounts the development of security and banking regulations and their impact on the development of the international securities markets.
In a corporate world crying out for financing, never has an understanding of the international bond markets and how they work been more important.Bonds without Bordersis therefore essential reading for those interested in economic development and preserving a free global market for capital.
This paper empirically evaluates four types of costs that may result from an international sovereign default: reputational costs, international trade exclusion costs, costs to the domestic economy through the financial system, and political costs to the authorities. It finds that the economic costs are generally significant but short-lived, and sometimes do not operate through conventional channels. The political consequences of a debt crisis, by contrast, seem to be particularly dire for incumbent governments and finance ministers, broadly in line with what happens in currency crises.